Identifying product development crises: The potential of adaptive heuristics by Münzberger, C. et al.
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
General rights 
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners 
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights. 
 
• Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research. 
• You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain 
• You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal  
 
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately 
and investigate your claim. 
   
 
Downloaded from orbit.dtu.dk on: Dec 18, 2017
Identifying product development crises: The potential of adaptive heuristics
Münzberger, C.; Stingl, Verena; Oehmen, Josef; Geraldi, Joana
Published in:
 Proceedings of the 21st International Conference on Engineering Design (ICED17), Vol. 2: Design Processes |
Design Organisation and Management,
Publication date:
2017
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Link back to DTU Orbit
Citation (APA):
Münzberger, C., Stingl, V., Oehmen, J., & Geraldi, J. (2017). Identifying product development crises: The
potential of adaptive heuristics. In  Proceedings of the 21st International Conference on Engineering Design
(ICED17), Vol. 2: Design Processes | Design Organisation and Management, (pp. 190-198). Design Society.
  
 
IDENTIFYING PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT CRISES: THE 
POTENTIAL OF ADAPTIVE HEURISTICS 
Muenzberg, Christopher (1); Stingl, Verena (2); Geraldi, Joana (2); Oehmen, Josef (2) 
1: Technical University of Munich, Germany; 2: Technical University of Denmark, Denmark 
 
Abstract 
This paper introduces adaptive heuristics as a tool to identify crises in design projects and highlights 
potential applications of these heuristics as decision support tool for crisis identification. Crises may 
emerge slowly or suddenly, and often have ambiguous signals. Thus the identification of a project crisis 
is often difficult. Yet, to allow fast crisis response, timely identification is critical for successful crisis 
management. Adaptive heuristics are successful judgement strategies when limited and ambiguous 
information is available. This article presents a theoretical proposition for the application of heuristics 
in design sciences. The paper compares crises to 'business as usual', and presents sixteen indicators for 
emerging crises in product development. These indicators are suggested as cues for adaptive heuristics. 
Specifically three heuristics are found to be well suited to support design practitioners to make robust 
inferences about the situation: 1. One-single-cue, 2. Fast-and-Frugal-Trees, and 3. Tallying. The paper 
presents application scenarios for these three heuristics and provides an outlook on further research on 
adaptive heuristics in design sciences. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
In product development crises, fast decision-making is crucial for the success and survival of the project. 
This starts with the very first decision: Is the project in a crisis that needs immediate action, or can we 
continue with development as usual? This decision is of highest importance since it determines future 
immediate actions, i.e. whether standard problem-solving processes will be followed or whether the 
situation is escalated, and designers will manage the situation as a crisis. The timely judgement whether 
the project is in a crisis has impact on potential success and failure of the project. If crises remain 
unidentified, no immediate action is taken, thus the crisis tends to become more acute, potential 
mitigation actions dwindle, and subsequent costs and time increase for getting the project back on track. 
However, if every situation escalates to a crisis, the usual development activities are interrupted 
unnecessarily, and the team loses momentum as well as ability to react when a 'real' crisis emerges. 
Deciding whether the project is in a crisis or not is challenging due to incomplete or ambiguous 
information, and a lack of time to gather more knowledge. There is a fine line between usual day-to-day 
changes and the early warning signs of a crisis or critical situation. The analysis of disciplines regularly 
facing crisis situations, e.g. civil and military aviation or emergency medicine, shows that situation 
awareness is an essential component for successful crisis management. Enhanced crisis identification 
skills contribute to improved situation awareness in projects. Thus the question arises: How can 
designers be a step ahead of the game, and quickly recognize the need for a more drastic intervention? 
In other words: How can designers reliably decide whether they are in a crises situation, under time 
pressure, and with lack of information? 
Traditional decision support tools, like Multiple Criteria Decision Making, require reliable information, 
well-structured problems, and are time consuming. Thus they struggle in circumstances of emerging 
crises. However, 'adaptive heuristics', a class of decision strategies based on typical human cognitive 
shortcuts in reasoning, can strive in these challenging conditions (Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier, 2011). 
These decision strategies omit certain information and rely only on a small number of ‘cues’ and are 
thus 'fast and frugal' (Gigerenzer et al., 1999). 
In this paper we will argue how adaptive heuristics can help enhance situation awareness, and support 
the design practitioner to come to robust inferences about the situation. In particular, we will propose 
three adaptive heuristics design practitioners can apply to identify a crisis quickly. 
The term 'heuristic' contains a broad array of different simplifying cognitive strategies and is only 
loosely defined. So far, design research has considered heuristics mostly as strategies or simple design 
rules to support the development process, but not for managerial decision-making. A keyword search 
for ‘heuristic*’ on the Design Society publication database1, summarized in Table 1, resulted in 44 
publications, of which 33 discussed design heuristics (e.g. Yilmaz et al., 2010; Voss et al., 2014; Sarnes 
et al., 2015). Other articles presented heuristics for teaching (e.g. Hillen et al., 2009), or biases 
introduced through the unconscious use of heuristics (e.g. Gräßler et al., 2016). Only one publication, 
Keller et al.'s (2006) article on change prediction, applied the term heuristic for a strategy to judge 
situations and support decision-making. A keyword search on Scopus for 'design' and 'heuristic*', 
limited to publications relevant to engineering design, resulted in similar findings of heuristics being 
used as design rules, but not for managerial decision-making and situation judgement. This overview 
shows the broad use of the term heuristics, and the current neglect of heuristics as a decision-making 
tool. 
Table 1. Results of keyword search for 'heuristic*' in the Design Society publication 
database (in total 44 publications, some are counted in two categories) 
Heuristics as… No of publications 
design rule 33 
tool for situation judgement 1 
root of biases 5 
other 9 
 
                                                     
 
1 https://www.designsociety.org/publications/5/papers 
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With this paper we introduce a new spin on heuristics as managerial decision support tool for design 
sciences. We focus on the concept of adaptive heuristics that are 'ecological rational', i.e. rational in the 
decision context they are applied. This concept from cognitive science and psychology has proven useful 
in other, similar applications, and is promising since "it is fast and frugal as it relies on "a minimum of 
time, knowledge, and computation to make adaptive choices" (Gigerenzer et al., 1999, p. 14)" (Artinger 
et al., 2015).  
This paper will present a conceptual proposition at the intersection of research on adaptive heuristics, 
and design sciences. The presented argument follows a "Borrowing and Extending" approach (Zahra 
and Newey, 2009) by introducing the theory of adaptive heuristics to design sciences and thus sparking 
research in a new context that can inform back to research on adaptive heuristics.  
In particular, we will present three heuristics from the ‘Adaptive Toolbox’, namely single-cue heuristics, 
lexicographic heuristics, and tallying strategies. We argue that these three heuristics can support design 
practitioners in crisis identification and increase their situation awareness. The paper has thus two goals: 
1. Introduction of the concept of adaptive heuristics to design sciences. 
2. Highlighting potential application of adaptive heuristics as decision support tool for crisis 
identification. 
To achieve these goals the remainder of the paper is divided in three parts. First, we give an overview 
about crises in product development. We highlight the special characteristics of a crisis and potential 
indicators to identify an upcoming crisis. We provide an overview of adaptive heuristics. Based on this, 
we present in the second part generic heuristics for the identification of a crisis in a product development 
project. In the third part we discuss our conclusions by giving an outlook how to study and formalize 
the proposed heuristics in the industry context and highlight potential application of heuristics in other 
decision problems in product development. 
With this paper we aim to contribute to research and industry alike. Regarding research in product 
development we introduce adaptive heuristics as decision-making strategies. Regarding industry we 
propose three heuristics which can help designers in making fast and frugal decisions. The application 
of these heuristics can support successful management of product development projects through 
company-specific adaptation. 
2 THEORETICAL FOUNDATION 
This section will introduce the key concepts of crises in product development, and adaptive heuristics. 
We thus provide the theoretical basis for subsequent theory building at the intersection of these two 
fields, which we will discuss in section 3. 
2.1 Business as usual vs. crisis 
Designers can be in different situations during the development of a product. In this paper we focus on 
one key distinction: business as usual (BaU) and crisis. Being aware of when the situation changes from 
BaU to crisis is important for the success of the project. 
We define BaU as a situation in which a designer follows – consciously or unconsciously – standard 
procedures, e.g. Pahl and Beitz (2013) or Ulrich and Eppinger (2016). In this situation the designer 
knows what to do and the necessary actions to solve challenges or problems. In some way his actions 
are intuitive and do not need a lot of effort. 
The term 'crisis' is widely used in many domains, e.g. in political sciences, business finance sciences, or 
psychology. Due to this wide use, no single definition dominates (Simola, 2005; Coombs, 2000). To 
narrow our research object and to give detailed descriptions, we build on the definition of crises in 
product development proposed by Münzberg et al. (2016). For the purpose of the paper we define a 
crisis in product development as: 
A product development crisis is an exceptional situation during the development or usage phase of a 
product. Crises are described with the three elements: causes, processes, and effects. 
Undesired, unexpected or unnoticed events cause a crisis. The situation has an individual impact on the 
team members, is limited in time, and has ambivalent outcome. It is associated with high time and result 
pressure. If a crisis is not solved it has serious impact on human life, environment or the company. 
In this definition we acknowledge the limited research on crises in design sciences and build on the 
finding of business management and organizational crisis management, e.g. Burnett (1998), Coombs 
and Holladay (2011; Milburn) or Mitroff (1988). This research is closely connected to crises in the 
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technical domain. Furthermore, they provide robust and tested models, crisis processes, and use cases 
which provide a good starting point for the characterisation of crises in product development. 
Based on the models from business management and organizational crisis management, Münzberg et 
al., 2016 highlighted the gap of knowledge regarding characteristics of crises in product development 
in a previous publication. In their study, based on Gericke et al. (2013), and a combination of literature 
review and interviews, they identified nine factors which characterize crises in product development: 
(1) project risk, (2) priority, (3) pressure to succeed, (4) individual time pressure, (5) coordination and 
division of work, (6) type of project control, (7) management support, (8) degree of motivation/morale, 
project motive, motivation and (9) reward and recognition. These factors have different characteristics 
in a crisis compared to BaU. The different manifestations of these characteristics for project risk, 
priority, pressure to succeed, and individual time pressure are shown in Table 2. 
Table 2. Comparison of business as usual and crisis 
Factor Business as usual Crisis 
Project risk ↓ → ↑ 
Priority ↓ → ↑ 
Pressure to succeed → ↑ 
Individual time pressure → ↑ 
Legend: ↓ = low, → = regular, ↑ = high 
 
The remaining five factors are more subtle in their differences between BaU and crisis. Projects in crises 
show special coordination and division of work, and different types of project control compared to BaU. 
Most notably, projects in crises often have special crisis management teams, so called firefighting or 
cheetah teams (Engwall and Svensson, 2004), which work decoupled from the daily business. These 
teams are supported by the top management to increase decision-making and availability of resources. 
Additionally, motivation of the team members and project differs from BaU. Since major goals of the 
company or project are threatened, the involved persons usually have high interest (intrinsic motivation2) 
to solve the crisis. These personal stakes are connected to the typical prioritisation of crises in 
companies, and the special recognition and reward to those contributing to overcoming the crisis. 
The causes of a crisis can be clustered in four categories: Origin, type of breakdown, time, and intention. 
Origins can be external events, i.e. events that arise outside the organization, or internal events, i.e. 
events that arise within the organization. The type of breakdown can be technical or economic problems, 
e. g. defects, accidents or system failure, or social and organizational events, e. g. sabotage, 
miscommunication or terrorism (Mitroff, 1988, p. 286ff.). Time-related analysis of crises in product 
development (Töpfer, 1999; Lindemann, 2009) show that causes can occur suddenly, e.g. food infected 
with Salmonella, or emerge in a creeping process, e.g. bad company strategies or decision traps during 
project work (van Oorschot et al., 2013). Finally, crises can be clustered by the intention. A crisis can 
be triggered by intentional actions, i.e. sabotage or fraud, or unintentional actions, e.g. mistakes or 
misunderstandings (Coombs, 1995, p. 455). 
Table 3. Overview of crisis indicators (Münzberg et al., 2015) 
Milestones overtime Complex problems with high pressure to action 
Exceed budget No experiences or algorithms to solve the problem 
Extension of project duration Approved strategies or mechanism do not operate 
Activities stagnating at 90%-Ready-State Interior restructuring is needed 
Critical goals are not reached Disorientation on all levels 
Additional tasks during project Overextension on all levels 
Disturbed relationships Situation seems unsolvable for all participants 
Unexpected or undesired events State of paralysis is dominating 
 
                                                     
 
2 For this paper we do not cover the issue of political motivated interests or the deviation between personal and company goals. For an overview of opportunistic 
behaviour in project decisions see Stingl and Geraldi (2017). 
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Due to the severity of the expected effects, identifying a crisis and starting counteractions are of major 
importance inside an organization. Crises are the result of unexpected, unmitigated or unnoticed risks 
and are often hidden until the risks materialize. However, there are indicators which can show an 
emerging crisis. Münzberg et al. (2015) identified sixteen indicators for an emerging crisis (see Table 
3). 
Depending on the type of the cause and type of crisis development process (sudden occurrence vs. 
creeping process) these indicators have different meaning. Therefore, the relevance of these indicators 
is project-specific. 
Risk management approaches support the early identification of potential causes of crises. Yet, not all 
potential crises can be identified and many are deliberately accepted and not mitigated. Moreover, if 
attempts of timely identification and mitigation of crises and their causes fail, the project enters a crisis 
and require crisis management (Geraldi et al., 2010). 
2.2 Adaptive heuristics 
This section will introduce the concept of adaptive heuristics. The human mind constantly has to make 
judgement and decisions in an environment of uncertainty, ambiguity and lack of information. To cope 
with this complexity, we rely on cognitive shortcuts, called heuristics, which allow us to make sense of 
the chaos (Gigerenzer and Brighton, 2009). When using heuristics, we omit certain information and rely 
only on a small number of ‘cues’, i.e. relevant bits of information, to come to a decision or judgement. 
This may be as simple as relying on one single cue alone. Using heuristics thus reduces the cognitive 
load in decision situations and allows remaining decisive even in time pressured situations. 
Research in cognitive sciences and psychology has kept a strong focus on the biases and errors that 
result when humans rely on heuristics in their decision-making – the departure point being Tversky and 
Kahneman’s seminal work “Judgement under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases” (1974). Prominent 
examples of such biases are e.g. the ‘recency heuristic’, in which recent events receive a higher perceived 
importance than those longer ago (Hogarth and Einhorn, 1992), or the ‘illusion of control’, where 
individuals overestimate the probability of personal success (Langer, 1975). However, research around 
the German psychologist Gerd Gigerenzer, has, over the past decades, shown the usefulness of heuristics 
when applied smart and in the right environment (Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier, 2011). They introduced 
the concept of ‘ecological rationality’ and the ‘adaptive toolbox’. Heuristics, as they claim, are neither 
good nor bad but a tool suitable for a specific problem and potentially useless for another (Pleskac and 
Hertwig, 2014). Gigerenzer et al.’s research program has revealed structural elements of adaptive 
heuristics, thus creating a classification of different heuristics and linking them with environments in 
which they can strive, i.e. where they are ‘ecologically rational’. This structured view of heuristics 
enables to better understand expert reasoning, test expert judgment strategies for their usefulness and 
accuracy, and even to extract them as formalized decision support tools (Gigerenzer and Brighton, 
2009). 
The heuristics in the ‘adaptive toolbox’ share three elements that define them (Gigerenzer and 
Gaissmaier, 2011). These elements are, first, a search rule, which guides in which order information is 
collected, second, a stopping rule, which determines when to stop searching for additional information, 
and third, a decision rule which defines how to infer a decision or judgement from the information 
collected. In this article we will discuss three specific types of heuristic structures, which we found to 
be particularly useful to increase situation awareness and judge whether or not current situation 
constitute a crisis situation. First, single-cue heuristics: for this type the rules would take the simple 
form search for the single cue, stop when you collected information on the cue, and decide based on the 
value or quality of the cue. Second, the class of lexicographic heuristics, which follows a predefined 
or random sequence of cues for which information is gathered sequentially, and assesses after each step 
whether more information needs to be gathered or a decision can be made, e.g. because two alternatives 
differ significantly based in the cue. Third, tallying strategies that collect information on a predefined 
set of cues and conclude a decision based on parallel consideration of all these cues (‘counting the 
“yes”’). 
An adaptive heuristic is ecologically rational given a certain decision environment, when it performs 
well in terms of predictive capabilities. Almost all real world judgements are bets, taking place in 
uncertain, possibly even random environments. Any strategy that supports decision-making is thus 
likely to fail in some instances. High predictive capability means consequently that the number of 
instances where the decision strategy leads to wrong inferences is low. Research on adaptive heuristics 
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has thus evaluated the predictive capability of heuristics compared to other typical decision support 
tools, like multiple linear regression models, neural networks, decision trees, and others. In a series of 
studies, Gigerenzer et al. have demonstrated that adaptive heuristics can be just as good, or even better, 
in making predictions, than more complex models for specific decision and judgement problems 
(Goldstein and Gigerenzer, 2009). This effect was particularly pronounced for judgement situations, in 
which the learning sample was relatively small or the information environment highly ambiguous 
(Brighton and Gigerenzer, 2015). 
More recent research has shown the usefulness of heuristics in real-world decision situations that require 
binary judgements based on unspecific, ambiguous information. Examples on where these heuristics 
have performed well come e.g. from emergency medicine, where a lexicographic approach provides 
robust estimates on the need for emergency care based on unspecific symptoms (Jenny et al., 2015), or 
from military application, where again a lexicographic heuristic could reduce the number of civilian 
fatalities at military checkpoints due to wrong threat assessment (Keller and Katsikopoulos, 2016). 
3 ADAPTIVE HEURISTICS FOR IDENTIFYING CRISIS SITUATIONS IN 
PRODUCT DESIGN 
This section will bridge the two fields introduced in the last section and propose a theoretical concept at 
their intersection. We will subsequently show how crises indicators (Table 3) can be used as cues in 
three different types of heuristics to support the decision maker in distinguishing between BaU and 
crisis. 
The judgement whether a design project is in a state of crisis is a tough call to make: Critical changes 
may creep in slowly, and signs that may indicate the crisis are often fuzzy or unspecific. While this is a 
difficult environment for traditional decision support tools like balanced scorecards (Kaplan and Norton, 
1997), it is an environment in which adaptive heuristics can perform well. The judgement problem for 
the design practitioner shares several key characteristics of the examples from emergency medicine and 
military operations cited before, most importantly: 
• incomplete information coupled with lack of time to collect additional information; 
• unspecific cues or signals that may have different potential roots; 
• cues and signals that are likely to be correlated; 
• dominance of experience, rather than book knowledge, regarding development of individual 
judgment capabilities. 
We thus argue that adaptive heuristics can be useful in the specific judgement case of crisis identification 
in design projects. Consequently, we make the following two propositions: 
1. Adaptive heuristics are – potentially unconsciously – applied by experienced design practitioners 
when they have to judge whether they are in a crisis situation or not. 
2. Useful adaptive heuristics can be made explicit and formalized to serve as decision support tools. 
To research the validity of the two propositions, we need to understand two elements that will enable us 
to identify heuristics. First, the potential cues that inform the judgement process and are considered 
relevant by the experienced practitioner. Second, the types of heuristics that are likely to be ecologically 
rational in the given judgement situation. 
Regarding the cues, we can build on the crisis indicators identified in Table 3. The indicators themselves 
are to a high degree unspecific to the individual design crisis, and may, taken alone, also be the result of 
more specific and better manageable root causes. However, they may together build a pattern that the 
experienced practitioner can identify as crisis that requires action. Identifying the cues that contribute 
with higher weight to the final judgement – which have the higher ‘cue validity’ – may not be possible. 
However, specific types of adaptive heuristics, like tallying, can accommodate for this challenge 
(Hogarth and Karelaia, 2006). Also, the majority of the indicators require qualitative judgement and are 
thus highly subjective. As such, they require a mode of consideration in the decision process that can 
accommodate for fuzzy signals, where the distinction between signal and noise is not clear cut. Again, 
adaptive heuristics, especially lexicographic approaches, are apt to deal with this challenge (Luan et al., 
2011). 
For the second element that informs future research, we propose three types of adaptive heuristics of 
which we argue they may be useful for structuring the cues in a way that allows robust judgements: 
One-single-cue, Fast-and-Frugal Trees, and Tallying. 
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One-single-cue is the simplest heuristic, being informed by only one cue that has both high cue validity 
and little fuzziness. Research has shown that business practitioners rely strongly on simple rules that 
consider only one cue (e.g. simple rules for strategy decisions (Bingham and Eisenhardt, 2011), hiatus 
heuristic in marketing (Wübben and Wangenheim, 2008), or step price heuristic in retail (Artinger, 
2012)). We can thus assume that design practitioners rely on similar simple rules for specific types of 
crises, e.g. when the cue is linked to a specific, non-acceptable issue like severe safety problems of the 
product. For a similar challenge, change prediction in product design, Keller et al. (2006) proposed three 
cues taken from graph theory measures that serve as single-cue heuristics with high predictive capability 
for the task. Examples of such One-single-cue heuristic might be technical failures covered in high 
profile media or a threat to user safety during product usage, e.g. Samsung Galaxy Note 7 crisis. 
Fast-and-Frugal-Trees are a more complex approach for considering relevant cues. They are a type of 
lexicographic heuristic, in which cues are ordered according to their validity and considered sequentially 
until a decision can be made. As such, they present themselves as skimmed down versions of decision 
trees, with only two branches per node, one of the branches always being an exit. Figure 1 shows a 
potential, non-validated structure of a Fast-and-Frugal-Tree for crisis identification. These heuristics are 
useful, when the general ordering of the cues is known but the clarity of the signal for each of the 
individual cues is fuzzy. 
 
Figure 1. Example of a potential Fast-and-Frugal-Tree to identify crises based on crisis 
indicators 
A Tallying approach is similar to Fast-and-Frugal-Trees, but instead of considering each cue 
independently, it considers all cues simultaneously and counts those that give indication for a crisis. The 
decision follows a predefined threshold of counts, above which the situation can be classified as crisis 
that requires action. This approach is suitable when there is no clear ordering in the importance of the 
individual cues, and furthermore when the signal of the cues is fuzzy. Figure 2 shows a potential 
structure of a Tallying checklist. 
 
Figure 2. Exemplary checklist for a Tallying approach 
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Concluding, we made the following two claims. First, crisis indicators can serve as cues for heuristics 
for identifying crises. Second, One-single-cue, Fast-and-Frugal-Trees, and Tallying approach are useful 
heuristic types for crisis identification. 
While literature in cognitive sciences and other application fields provide strong support for the second 
claim in particular, we currently lack evidence of their validity in the field of design crisis identification. 
However, following these claims and the proposition stated earlier, we may now formulate hypotheses 
that can be tested and validated through expert interviews or simulation experiments. 
4 DISCUSSION AND OUTLOOK 
In this paper, we have outlined a proof of concept that adaptive heuristics can support design 
practitioners in identifying product development crises. As we have shown in the theoretical 
foundations, crises are exceptional situations and far away from business as usual. Crises are dangerous 
for companies and projects success. Due to this, crises have to be detected as fast as possible by the 
project team. However, traditional decision-making tools may struggle due to ambiguous information 
and time pressure. A promising approach for such decision-making are adaptive heuristics. By focusing 
on a small number of cues and omitting information adaptive heuristics help decision-makers, e. g. 
project managers, to cope with complex situations. We introduced three heuristics, One-single-cue, Fast-
and-Frugal-Trees, and Tallying approach, as possible tools to differentiate business as usual from crisis. 
Research in other disciplines, like emergency medicine or military operations, supports the claim that 
adaptive heuristics are useful strategies to assess situations in time pressured situations with limited and 
ambiguous information. However, the applicability and reliability of heuristics in product development 
and especially crisis identification has yet to be studied. For this, research needs to build upon expert 
knowledge to develop valuable heuristics for the application in industrial project work. For this reason 
we plan in our future research empirical studies, e.g. expert or group interviews and simulations, to 
verify the two hypothesis: 
1. Adaptive heuristics are used by designers to identify potential crisis situations. 
2. Formalized adaptive heuristics can support designers in identifying crisis situations. 
In these studies we want to gather insight which implicit heuristics experienced practitioners use to make 
judgements and decisions. Furthermore, we want to explore the reliability of formalized heuristics for 
real-world judgement and decision problems in product development. 
Further we want to highlight, that this paper focussed on designers in project work. However, we are 
convinced that the proposed decision-strategies are also useful for all project team members, e.g. 
engineers, constructors or project managers. Hence, the future empirical study should focus on these 
groups equally. 
While we illustrated the potential for adaptive heuristics in crisis identification, we argue, that these 
heuristics can be useful for design decisions beyond situation judgements, e. g. crisis solution or 
engineering design problem solving. Some of the concepts developed in the research of adaptive 
heuristics have recently been picked up in aerospace engineering (e.g. Sarosh and Yun-Feng, 2016; 
Canellas et al., 2015; Khan and Sarosh, 2013), and are worth exploring as design decision support in 
other fields of engineering design. Katsikopoulos (2012) overview of useful insights from psychology 
for design further shows the potential of adaptive heuristics in the field. 
We thus believe that the introduction of the concept of adaptive heuristics to design science can spark 
insightful research, and provide useful contributions to the practice of design projects. 
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